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UNCONSCIONABLE CLAIMS AND THE
PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY ACT
DOUGLAS J. WHALEY"
Section 4-403 (b) of the proposed bankruptcy act provides that
a creditor shall be allowed to share in the distribution of an estate
"except to the extent in amount that . . . (8) the claim is an un-
conscionable consumer claim." Section 4-403(c) elaborates:
(c) UNCONSCIONABILITY. Without limiting the scope
of paragraph (8) of subsection (b), the following, among other
things, may be considered as pertinent to the issue of unconscion-
ability:
(1) The degree to which unfair advantage was taken against
the debtor in any aspect of the transaction from which the claim
arises or in any aspect of any enforcement of the claim, because
of -his lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or physical or mental
capacity.
(2) Substantial disparity between the price of goods or serv-
ices and their value as measured by the price of the same or com-
parable goods or services generally prevailing at the time in his
community.
(3) Definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations,
rulings, and decisions of State and Federal legislative, adminis-
trative, and judicial bodies.
This is the language of the bill drafted by the Commission on Bank-
ruptcy Laws. In the version sponsored by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges the wording is the same except that the word "con-
sumer" is stricken from section 4-403(b)(8), thus making unconscion-
ability a defense to the allowance of claims filed in a commercial bank-
ruptcy.
2
t Professor of Law, Indiana University, Indianapolis Law School; B.A. 1965,
University of Maryland; J.D. 1968, University of Texas Law School.
1. The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws' proposed act is H.R. 31 and S. 235,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Act]. The Bankruptcy
Judges' version is H.R. 32 and S. 236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
2. This result might also obtain under the version containing the word "con-
sumer." The Commission's Note following section 4-403 states in paragraph 7 that sub-
section (8) "does not limit any existing authority of a bankruptcy court as a court of
equity to deny allowance of a business claim on unconscionability grounds." See In re
Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 386 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Gor-
don, Unconscionability in Bankruptcy: The Federal Contribution to Commercial De-
cency, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 741 (1972); Note, 67 CoLum. L. Rxv. 583 (1967).
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The doctrine of unconscionability is almost entirely limited in ap-
plication to cases involving the sale of goods under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, or to cases in which the UCC's version is used by
analogy.3 The creation of a federal unconscionability standard that all
creditors must meet is a significant jurisdictional expansion of the con-
cept. Moreover, the unconscionability standard proposed by section 4-
403(c) has the appearance of being clearer than that found in the
UCC, where it is left completely undefined. This article will explore
the proposed definition of "unconscionability," the practical effect of
the adoption of the section, and the wisdom of including an unconscion-
ability defense in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Before plunging into a dissection of the above definition of uncon-
scionability, there must be some discussion of the meaning of the term
as developed "in statutes, regulations, rulings, and decisions of State
and Federal legislative, administrative, and judicial bodies,"4 now in-
cluded in the Proposed Act by subsection 3 of section 4-403(c).
Those familiar with the history of UCC section 2-302 (unconscionabil-
ity in the sale of goods), including the cases and commentary thereon,
should omit the digression below and skip to the bankruptcy discussion
beginning in Pdrt II.
I. BACKGROUND: UNCONSCIONABILITY AND THE UCC
Unconscionability is not a new reason for refusing to enforce a
contract. In 1750 a court of equity used the doctrine to invalidate in
part a post-obituary contract in which a debtor promised to repay
double his borrowings out of his expected inheritance. 5 In that case
an "unconscionable" contract was defined as one "no man in his senses
and not under a delusion would make on the one hand, and as no hon-
est and fair man would accept on the other." Other early, popular
tests asked whether there existed in the contract "an inequality so
strong, gross and manifest, that it is impossible to state it to a man of
common sense without producing an exclamation at the inequality of
it,"' or whether the contract "shocks the conscience."' Because these
3. See, e.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971)
(section 2-302 applied to gas station lease). For other statutes using the term see notes
65 & 73 infra.
4. Proposed Act § 4-403(c).
5. Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Rep. 82 (Ch. 1750).
6. Id. at 100.
7. Gwynne v. Heaton, 28 Eng. Rep. 949, 953 (Ch. 1778). Professor Leff might
call this the "dropped jaw" test. See Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Em-
peror's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. Rnv. 485, 498 (1967).
8. Eyre v. Potter, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 42, 59 (1853).
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tests were widely quoted in the first state court opinions on the subject
and because there is as yet little statutory guidance to the meaning of
"unconscionability," these primitive guidelines are still routinely trotted
out in modern unconscionability cases. Indeed, in spite of initially
promising attempts under the UCC, "unconscionability" may be no
nearer a workable definition today than in these early cases.
The doctrine of unconscionability has had an uphill climb to sur-
mount common-law rules like caveat emptor, the presumption that
everyone reads and understands that which he signs, and the basic right
of freedom of contract. Equity recognized the doctrine at an early
stage, but the law court judges had to bend other doctrines (fraud,
duress, strict construction of language, etc.) to aid those caught in the
toils of a serpentine agreement. The courts were slow to see that the
duty to read should have ended when the introduction of form contracts
killed the desire to read,' or that freedom of contract does not neces-
sarily include freedom of adhesion contract. 10
The adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code presented the
courts with a statutory unconscionability doctrine in section 2-302:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the con-
tract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making
the determination."
The advent of this section was inevitable. It was the natural corrective
response of a legal system that found itself straitjacketed with rigid
rules that were originally sound but which failed to produce justice in
9. For a good discussion of the current standing of the doctrine, see Calamari,
Duty To Read-A Changing Concept, 43 FORD. L. Rnv. 341 (1974).
10. I. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS (Teachers' Manual) 9-8 (1971) (commenting on
Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498 (Alas. 1962) ). Professor Murray has
said that freedom of contract does not mean freedom to dictate "equal treatment of
unequals." Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1, 28
(1969).
11. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
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the commercial world as it had evolved. A similar problem in the old
English courts produced the original courts of equity.
The UCC does not define "unconscionability." Official Comment
1 to section 2-30212 is singularly unhelpful and has been much criticized
by all the commentators.' s The early UCC cases produced little in the
way of helpful definition or analysis of the problem. The most fre-
quently repeated quotation is this statement by Judge J. Skelly Wright
in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.:'
4
Unconscionability has generally been recognized to include an
absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to-
gether with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particu-
lar case can only be determined by consideration of all the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. In many cases the meaning-
fulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bargaining
power. The manner in which the contract was entered is also rele-
vant to this consideration. Did each party to the contract, con-
sidering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable op-
portunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the im-
portant terms hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by de-
ceptive sales practices? Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement
without full knowledge of its terms might be held to assume the
risk that he has entered a one-sided bargain. But when a party
of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a com-
mercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge of its
terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective mani-
festation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. In such
12. This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police ex-
plicitly against the contracts or.clauses which they find to be unconscionable.
In the past such policing has been accomplished by adverse construction of lan-
guage, by manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determina-
tions that the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose
of the contract. This section is intended to allow the court to pass directly
on the unconscionability of the contract or particular clause therein and to
make a conclusion of law as to its unconscionability. The basic test is
whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as
to be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the mak-
ing of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear that it is proper for the
court to hear evidence upon these questions. The principle is one of preven-
tion of oppression and unfair surprise (Cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172
F.2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because
of superior bargaining power. The underlying basis of this section is illus-
trated by the results in cases such as the following: [citations to ten cases
dealing with unfair warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations, which mat-
ters, the scholarly commentators point out, are more adequately regulated by
other sections of the Code, e.g., §§ 2-316, 2-7191.
UNIFORM COMMERCLM CODE § 2-302, Comment 1.
13. The most complete dissection of the Official Comment is found in Leff, supra
note 7, at 489-528.
14. 350 F.2d 445, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 955 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
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a case the usual rule that the terms of the agreement are not to
be questioned should be abandoned and the court should consider
whether the terms of the contract are so unfair that enforcement
should be withheld.15
The legal scholars came next. The first to speak was the redoubt-
able Professor Arthur Leff, who wrote a celebrated article attacking
section 2-302 and its unconscionability principle as "an emotionally sat-
isfying incantation" having "no reality referent," and suggesting that
unconscionability be discarded in favor of a more concrete test of un-
fairness.' 6 Leff's chief contribution to the analysis of the problem was
his division of unconscionability into two types: unfair conduct in the
formation of the contract (called "procedural unconscionability"), and
unconscionability in the terms of the resulting bargain (called "substan-
tive unconscionability").1 7  Leff's article provoked a barrage of schol-
arly responses defending unconscionability as a workable concept.'3
Scholars defined it as a rule that forbade terms that were "manifestly
unreasonable," or bargaining conduct that was "oppressive' or "surpris-
ing." Unconscionability was compared with the English doctrine of
"fundamental breach" (a contracting party may not disclaim or escape
performance of the basic "core" of the agreement),' 9 or explained in
terms of tests such as "when the transaction was consummated and the
names had been affixed to the writing, did the party who is now assert-
ing that the clause settles the dispute have a justifiable expectation that
this clause would be enforced by a court?"2
The early cases were roundly scored by all the scholars because
the courts' opinions rarely elucidated the factual elements that consti-
tuted the alleged unconscionability. Thus the Williams case failed to
specify whether the unconscionability was the selling of a stereo to a
ghetto resident or the blanket repossession of all her prior purchases
on default in the payment for one. Similarly, in American Home Im-
15. Id. at 449-50, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. at 958-59 (footnotes omitted).
16. See Leff, supra note 7, at 558.
17. Id. at 487.
18. See Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969);
Murray, supra note 10; Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L.
REv. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 359 (1970). Left's reply to all this is in Leff, Unconscionability and the
Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 349 (1970).
See also R. NoRDSTROM, SALEs 128 (1970); J. WHrrE & R. SumMERs, UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 4 (1972).
19. See Ellinghaus, supra note 18, at 797; Murray, supra note 18, at 73; Spanogle,
supra note 18, at 945-46. See also Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract, 77 L.Q.
REV. 98 (1961).
20. R. NoRDsTRoM, supra note 18, at 128.
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provement, Inc. v. Maclver2' the New Hampshire Supreme Court
found a home improvement contract price "unconscionable" without
explaining what economic factors in the price were unjustified.2 The
scholars, particularly Professor Leff, were afraid that section 2-302
would produce just this sort of mystifying use of unconscionability with-
out a detailed explanation of the unconscionable elements. To some
degree the later cases have dignified this concern, finding contracts or
clauses in contracts unconscionable with little or no explanation of the
underlying factors.2 3  Other courts have tried to put into print the con-
siderations felt relevant to a finding of unconscionability.
In Jones v. Star Credit Corp.24 a New York court declined to re-
duce unconscionability to a mathematical ratio, but declared the sale
of an overpriced freezer unconscionable after indulging in a balancing
test which weighed "the necessity and even the desirability of install-
ment sales and the extension of credit" against the "very limited finan-
cial resources of the purchaser," the "value disparity" (equated with
the seller taking a "knowing advantage"), and the "gross inequality of
bargaining power."2 5
In Urdang v. Muse26 a New Jersey court equated unconscionabil-
ity with the UCC section 1-203 concept of "good faith" (defined as
"honesty in fact'), the sine qua non of all UCC transactions.
In Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.217 the District of
Columbia appellate court stated that unconscionability consists of two
elements: an absence of meaningful choice and contract terms unrea-
sonably favorable to the other party.
The most extensive test of unconscionability was developed by
Justice Pashman of the New Jersey Supreme Court in his dissent in
King v. South Jersey National Bank:28
21. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 235 (1964).
22. J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 18, at 122 n.48, calls the MacIver opinion
"sloppy."
23. See, e.g., Dean v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 114 N.J. Super. 132, 275 A.2d
154, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1113 (App. Div. 1971); Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds,
324 N.Y.S.2d 813, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 570 (Civ. Ct. 1971); Nosse v. Vulcan Basement
Waterproofing, Inc., 64 Ohio Op. 2d 114, 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 1134 (Euclid Mun. Ct.
1973).
24. "59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
25. Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 267, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. at 79.
26. 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 1220 (Dist. Ct. 1971).
See also In re Johnson, 13 UCC REP. SERv. 953 (D. Neb. 1973) (bankr. ref.); In re
Jackson, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (bankr. ref.).
27. 277 A.2d 111, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 27 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971).
28. 66 NJ. 161, 330 A.2d 1, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 969 (1974).
[Vol. 531242
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In such a case, the proper question for the Court to ask is:
Is this a remedial provision which a reasonable consumer would
have accepted had he had the bargaining power and the commer-
cial sophistication to negotiate with the seller on a reasonably even
basis? There is, needless to say, a wide range of terms which rea-
sonable consumers might be willing to accept in return for the con-
sideration which the seller has in fact offered. This standard does
not require that the merchant offer the consumer the most favor-
able possible terms. All that the principles of unconscionability re-
quire is that the terms be within the range of acceptability to a rea-
sonable consumer.
29
Beyond these few definitions, the later UCC courts 'have been
content to find unconscionability in certain routine factual patterns: ex-
cessive price,30 excessive creditor remedy, 1 lack of meaningful debtor
remedy, 2 and harsh dealings with the poor and uneducated. 33  The
courts have not found unconscionability present in certain other situa-
29. Id. at 200, 330 A.2d at 22, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. at 996.
30. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 559 (1971);
Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78, 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 798 (Dist.
Ct. 1970); Toker v. Pel, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 1171
(L. Div. 1968), affd, 108 N.J. Super. 129, 260 A.2d 244, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 194 (App.
Div. 1970); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 6 UCC
Rep. Serv. 76 (Sup. Ct. 1969); State ex rel. Lefkowitz v. I.T.M., Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39,
275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 775 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Central Budget Corp. v. San-
chez, 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.YS.2d 391, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 69 (Civ. Ct. 1967); Frosti-
fresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1058
(Dist. Ct. 1966), revid as to damages, 4 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964, 4 UCC Rep.
Serv. 300 (App. T. 1967).
31. In re Johnson, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 953 (D. Neb. 1973) (bankr. ref.) (security
agreement used in terrorem); Urdang v. Muse, 114 N.J. Super. 372, 276 A.2d 397, 8
UCC Rep. Serv. 1220 (Dist. Ct. 1971) (refusal to take debtor's offer of amount in de-
fault); Robinson v. Jefferson Credit Corp., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 15 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)
(refusal to take debtor's offer of amount in default); Kosches v. Nichols, 327 N.Y.S.2d
968, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 147 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1971) (clauses limited right to move,
declared death a default, and gave creditor the right to enter the debtor's home to seize
the goods); Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Umberto, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 1181 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1970) (forfeiture declared for slight default); Fontaine v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 111
R.I. 6, 298 A.2d 521 (1973) (self help repossession without notice after earlier defaults
excused).
32. Morris v. Chevrolet Motor Div., 39 Cal. App. 3d 917, 114 Cal. Rptr. 747, 14
UCC Rep. Serv. 1294 (1974); Chrysler Corp. v. Wilson Plumbing Co., 132 Ga. App.
435, 208 S.E.2d 321, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 78 (1974); Jacobs v. Metro Chrysler-Ply-
mouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250, 10 UCC Rep. Serv. 771 (1972); Collins
v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 294 (1974) (per cur-
iam); Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685,
297 N.Y.S.2d 108, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 1213 (1968). For a good discussion of the inter-
play of unconscionability and warranty disclaimer, see Weintraub, Disclaimer of War-
ranties and Limitation of Damages for Breach of Warranty Under the UCC, 53 TExAs
L. Rav. 60, 80-83 (1974).
33. Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 559 (1971);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 6 UCC :Rep. Serv. 76
(Sup. Ct. 1969).
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tions: those in which the parties indulged in extensive negotiation of
the contract terms,3 4 in which the parties were involved in an experi-
mental project and naturally wanted to limit unknown liability,35 in
which the injured party was free to get a better deal elsewhere had he
shopped around,36 and in which someone who should have known bet-
ter entered into a bad bargain and then wanted out.3 7
In spite of the efforts of the courts and commentators, unconscion-
ability remains undefined except to the extent that it is the commercial
equivalent of Justice Potter Stewart's definition of "hard core pornog-
raphy": we know it when we see it. The closest anyone has come
to workable guidelines for applying the doctrine is Karl Llewellyn, the
man responsible for section 2-302, who proposed this much-discussed
"true answer":
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about "as-
sent" to boiler-plate clauses, we can recognize that so far as con-
cerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has in fact been
assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad
type of the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing
more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unrea-
sonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which
do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered
terms. The fine print which has not been read has no business
to cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which
constitute the dominant and only real expression of agreement, but
much of it commonly belongs in.38
Llewellyn added that the boiler-plate clauses were valid if (a) they did
34. Cryogenic Equip., Inc. v. Southern Nitrogen, Inc., 490 F.2d 696, 14 UCC Rep.
Serv. 420 (8th Cir. 1974); Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp.
520, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
35. Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 6 UCC Rep. Serv.
589 (7th Cir. 1969); United States Fibres, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp.
449, 13 UCC Rep. 254 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
36. County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'r Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 8
UCC Rep. Serv. 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affl'd, 444 F.2d 372, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 206 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); Morris v. Capitol Furniture & Appliance Co.,
280 A.2d 775, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 577 (D.C. App. 1971); Monsanto Co. v. Alden Leeds,
Inc., 130 N.J. Super. 245, 326 A.2d 90, 15 UCC Rep. Serv. 638 (L. Div. 1974).
37. Defendant's real argument is that now, some six months after he signed
the stipulation, he wishes he had not. While defendant may have been unwise
to assume responsibility for the debt of his grown son, assume it he did. The
doctrine of unconscionability is not a charter of economic anarchy. Contracts
still bind and debts are still payable. A promisor can be relieved of his obli-
gation, of course, but only when the transaction affronts the sense of decency
without which business is mere predation and the administration of justice an
exercise in bookkeeping.
Gimbel Bros. v. Swift, 7 UCC Rep. Serv. 300, 301 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1970).
38. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMrON: DEcIDING APPEALS 370
(1960). Many of the scholars exploring the meaning of "unconscionability" compare
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not alter or impair the fair meaning of the dickered terms when read
alone, and (b) they were not "manifestly unreasonable and unfair."39
All of the unconscionability commentators have started from this
point-in effect Llewellyn has become the "base" in the scholarly game
of hide-and-seek unconscionability. But while there is obviously more
content in Llewellyn's approach than in most of the subsequent sugges-
tions, substituting "manifestly unreasonable and unfair" for "uncon-
scionability" hardly solves the problem.
I think it is time that we faced up to the fact that unconscionability
is now undefined and is possibly undefinable. As long as the doctrine
is with us, the best that we can hope for is that its application will be-
come more and more predictable as courts wield it in similar factual
patterns, or, better yet, take the time to report the underlying policy
considerations on which their findings of unconscionability are based.40
For the most part, however, unconscionability will be a wild card doc-
trine, a carte blanche for judges to vent whatever sympathy they feel
for the debtor in the situation in which he finds himself. If the sym-
pathy is strong enough the contract or its clauses are deemed "uncon-
scionable," with a resulting bonus to the debtor and an unpleasant sur-
prise for the creditor.
If. UNCONSCIONABILITY AND BANKRUPTCY
A. The Current Law
The present bankruptcy act does not mention the word "uncon-
scionability." The closest it comes to giving the bankruptcy courts the
authority to evaluate the fairness of the proffered claims is in the grant
of equitable jurisdiction in sections 2(a) and 57(k).41  In Manufactur-
ers' Finance Co. v. McKey 42 the United States Supreme Court held that
Llewellyn's discussion to the English doctrine of "fundamental breach." For a major
article doing so, see Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental
Breach, 50 VA. L. REv. 1178 (1964).
39. K. LLEwELLYN, supra note 38, at 371.
40. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), a
pre-Code case invalidating automobile warranty disclaimers, is often cited as an admira-
ble example of a court's lucid examination of the factors involved in a declaration of
unconscionability. What the commentators fail to consider when they ask why this is
not done more often is that the Henningsen opinion runs thirty-two pages -in the Atlan-
tic Reporter, Second Series.
41. Section 2(a) of the Bankruptcy Act invests the bankruptcy courts with "such
jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them to exercise original jurisdiction in
proceedings under this Act," 11 U.S.C. § 11 (1971), and section 57(k) states that
"[c]laims which have been allowed may be reconsidered for cause and reallowed or re-
jected in whole or in part according to the equities of the case, before but not after the
estate has been closed." Id. § 93 (k).
42. 294 U.S. 442 (1935).
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the bankruptcy court had no inherent ability to examine the fairness
of a claim that was valid under state law unless the creditor involved
was asking the bankruptcy court to take affirmative equitable action on
his behalf. The Court has, however, required the equitable subordina-
tion of claims, so that they are paid only when all other claims are satis-
fied, if the claimant dealt inequitably with other claimants, or if the
bankruptcy occurred because of the claimant's mismanagement of the
debtor's affairs." The extent to which the bankruptcy court's equi-
table powers are limited by state law and Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins44 is unclear if the researcher consults only Supreme Court deci-
sions. After a detailed analysis of the decisions (which will not be re-
peated here), Professor Gordon has concluded:
To summarize, the Supreme Court has held that state law is
irrelevant in bankruptcy when the creditor's conduct is inequitable
and harms rival creditors . . . , and that state law is not only rele-
vant but controlling when the creditor's conduct is equitable ...
Where the creditor's conduct is inequitable but not directed against
rival creditors, the Court has been ambivalent.
4"
In 1965 Bankruptcy Referee Bertram Wolfe refused in two identi-
cal cases46 to allow the claim of a finance company that had loaned the
bankrupt corporation money but had engaged in the following conduct
which the referee found to be unconscionable: (1) forced incorpo-
ration to take advantage of extremely high interest rates, (2) made the
debtor agree not to borrow elsewhere without the finance company's
permission, but gave no assurance of further loans if permission were
denied, (3) made the debtor agree not to suspend business or file
bankruptcy, (4) reserved to itself the right to change unilaterally the
terms of the contract, (5) further reserved the right to accelerate the
collection of interest to be due on future transactions, and (6) made
the debtor agree that the finance company could have the debtor's mail
delivered to the finance company, which would then open it, read it,
and, if it liked, throw it away. On appeal, the federal district court
analyzed the Supreme Court decisions, held that a bankruptcy court did
43. See Note, Bankruptcy: Power To Subordinate On Equitable Grounds Claims
Valid Under State Law, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 586-89 (1967). The leading Supreme
Court cases are Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939), and Taylor v. Standard Gas &
Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
44. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. Gordon, supra note 2, at 755.
46. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (bankr.




have the equitable power to disallow unconscionable claims, and sent
the case back to the referee for a factual hearing on the question of
unconscionability similar to that under UCC section 2-302(2). 47 The
case, known as In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., has been both crit-
icized ("The structure of the Act itself suggests that Congress did not
intend that every claim in bankruptcy be subjected to a double standard
of validity"48), and praised ("The hard fact remains that there is some-
thing unhealthy about a legal system that has to stand idly by while a
shoddy claimant abuses its processes"49); but, with one exception,5 it
has been followed by later bankruptcy courts.51 In In re Johnson52 the
referee refused to recognize the security interest of a creditor who had
deliberately taken a security interest that he knew to be invalid under
UCC section 9-204(4)(b). 53 The creditor was found to have taken
the security interest for its in terrorem value.
By purporting to take a security interest in "all household and con-
sumer goods now or hereafter located on borrower's premises," the
creditor is falsely misrepresenting to the client the true extent of
the collateral. Upon default, the creditor can represent to the
debtor its authority for repossessing everything of value owned by
the debtor. The value of such a clause as a collection tool is in-
finite, and most low-income debtors when confronted with such
representations will conduct themselves accordingly, either by sur-
rendering all their personal property or by continuing to make pay-
ments.5
4
The clauses condemned in Elkins-Dell and Johnson were not suscepti-
ble to direct attack under section 2-302 because sales of goods (the
UCC Article 2 transactional base) were not involved. If a sale of
goods were the foundation of the claim, the bankruptcy court could of
course use section 2-302 as a state law ground for refusing total or par-
tial recognition of the claim.
47. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 386 (E.D.
Pa. 1966).
48. Note, 67 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 43, at 588.
49. Gordon, supra note 2, at 746.
50. In re Advance Printing & Litho Co., 277 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa.), a! 'd sub
nom. Advance Printing & Litho Co. v. Bentz, 387 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1967) (per cur-
iam).
51. In re Johnson, 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 953 (D. Neb. 1973) (bankr. ref.); In re
Jackson, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 1152 (W.D. Mo. 1971) (bankr. ref.).
52. 13 UCC Rep. Serv. 953 (D. Neb. 1973) (bankr. ref.).
53. UNnoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(4) (b) provides that no security interest
attaches to consumer goods acquired ten days after the secured party gives value.
54. 13 UCC Rep. Serv. at 956.
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B. The Proposed Law
The proposed bankruptcy act mentions unconscionability in two
subsections of section 4-403. Subsection (b) states that a claim "shall
be allowed except to the extent in amount that . . (8) the claim is
an unconscionable claim." Subsection (c) then elaborates on the
meaning of "unconscionability":
(c) UNCONSCIONABILITY. Without limiting the scope
of paragraph (8) of subsection (b), the following, among other
things, may be considered as pertinent to the issue of unconscion-
ability:
(1) The degree -to which unfair advantage was taken against
the debtor in any aspect of the transaction from which the claim
arises or in any aspect of any enforcement of the claim, because
of his lack of knowledge, ability, experience, or physical or mental
capacity.
(2) Substantial disparity between the price of goods or serv-
ices and their value as measured by the price of the same or com-
parable goods or services generally prevailing at the time in his
community.
(3) Definitions of unconscionability in statutes, regulations,
rulings, and decisions of State and Federal legislative, administra-
tive, and judicial bodies.55
The first thing notable about the language of section 4-403(b) is
that the claim is allowed except to the extent in amount that it is an
unconscionable claim. Does this mean that the only element of the
transaction that is subject to an examination for unconscionability is the
price? Or is the administrator (or the judge to whom his decision is
appealed) permitted to look at all the contract terms, strike the uncon-
scionable ones, and subtract from the claim the "amount" (the propor-
tion?) that the unconscionable term represents? If the new act means
to limit the unconscionability determination solely to the price term,
then the bankruptcy courts are being forced into an economic thicket
that all the commentators warn is very thorny indeed."0 Moreover, if
price regulation is all that is permitted, then the overbroad security in-
terest stricken by the referee in Johnson, and similar pernicious clauses,
will survive intact as allowable claims.57
55. Proposed Act § 4-403(b)-(c).
56. Gordon, supra note 2, at 768: "Regulation of prices by a multitude of refer-
ees on an ad hoc basis making adjustments for variables in each transaction is, to say
the least, unworkable." Speidel, supra note 18, at 371, says that price regulation is "an
area where angels, courts, and market economists have traditionally feared to tread
57. At least, this result would follow unless Elkins-Dell type equity power lives on
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Such a limitation could not have been intended. One of the other
seven subsections of section 4-403(b), subsection (b)(1), refers to
disallowance because "under any other applicable law the debtor can
defend against the enforcement of the claim," which seems to incorpo-
rate a host of remedies having nothing to do with reduction of the
amount allegedly due: striking of an invalid security interest, assertion
of failure to comply with conditions precedent to the validity of the
claim (tender, notice, etc.), insistence that the commercial paper credi-
tor establish his holder in due course status, and so on. Further, as
was explored in the above discussion of unconscionability under the
UCC,68 the statutes and cases referred to in proposed section 4-403(c)
(3) have not limited the doctrine to the unconscionability of the
amount claimed, but include unconscionability in the contract negotia-
tion (procedural unconscionability), and unconscionability in any of the
resulting terms (substantive unconscionability). Finally price uncon-
scionability is specifically mentioned in section 4-403(c)(2), which in-
dicates that the words "unfair advantage" in (c)(1) refer to uncon-
scionable terms other than price.
The definition of unconscionability in section 4-403(c) is interest-
ing for other reasons. Subsection (1) appears to refer to both
procedural and substantive unconscionability, but subsection (2) ap-
pears to apply to substantive price unconscionability alone, with no re-
quirement that the debtor's consent to the unconscionable price have
been unfairly obtained. Suppose a law professor who teaches commer-
cial law goes to a boat store and buys an expensive sailboat. The pro-
fessor indulged in no comparative shopping and had no prior knowl-
edge of the price of sailboats, and is later astounded to learn that
identical sailboats are sold at one third the cost by all other dealers in
town. If, God forbid, the law professor files for bankruptcy, could the
administrator disallow the boat seller's claim solely on the section 4-403
(c)(2) ground of substantial price disparity? Most commentators have
argued that unconscionability does not exist unless both procedural and
substantive unfairness are present in the transaction, " but here the pro-
fessor appears to have assented freely to the unfair term so that no pro-
cedural unconscionability occurred. Nonetheless, were I the admin-
in the new Act as the Commission suggests in its note to section 4-403. See note 2
supra. In light of the explicitness of section 4-403, however, this line of reasoning will
run into problems with the expressio unius est exclusio alterius doctrine.
58. See text accompanying notes 5-41 supra.
59. See, e.g., Spanogle, supra note 18, at 968.
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istrator or bankruptcy judge, I would disallow the claim based on the
language of section 4-403(c)(2) and my own belief that failure to in-
dulge in comparative shopping ought not to bar use of the unconscion-
ability defense. To hold otherwise is to say to the unscrupulous (but
non-competitive) creditor: "Impose any terms you like-short of
fraud-and we will not condemn your unconscionable behavior as long
as your debtor should have known enough to have avoided you." It
is bad policy to give an unconscionability license to creditors on the con-
dition that they may use it only when they can catch the consumer be-
having foolishly. Certainly it was unwise for the professor to buy a
boat without looking around first, but how many of us have not had
similar lapses? The penalty for this lack of wisdom may have been
bankruptcy, but that does not mean the creditor should keep his pound
of flesh. Or, if you insist on procedural unconscionability, approach
the problem this way. The professor, when he bought the sailboat, be-
lieved, as the merchant was bound to know, that the price was more
or less competitive in the local community, and the merchant let him
sign the contract under this delusion. There is procedural unconscion-
ability in the merchant's bad faith appropriation of the professor's
money when the latter's delusion is obvious. This is hardly the good
faith dealing the law requires.60 Of course, before disallowing the
claim the administrator or judge must explore the economics of the sit-
uation and determine that the price charged is in fact unconscionable-
that too much profit is being collected by the seller, or that his claimed
expenses are inflated. This is a complicated inquiry,8 ' but one the
courts have been willing to make, 2 and one that section 4-403(c)(2)
commands them to undertake.
Another problem with the proposed language is in figuring out
what section 4-403 (c) (1) adds to the definition of unconscionability.
Unconscionability is defined in that section as involving a consideration
of "the degree to which unfair advantage was taken against the debtor
60. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-203, 2-103(1)(b) (defining "good
faith" for a merchant as "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade").
61. For example, a well-known FTC investigation of ghetto merchants' charges re-
vealed that their net profit margin was not substantially greater than suburban mer-
chants even though their prices were on the average two and one-half times as great.
See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND
RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF DISTRICT OF COLuMIBIA RETAILERS (1968). The excess
price was caused primarily by the ghetto merchants' higher expenses, some of which
were justified (insurance) and some of which were questionable (high commissions to
salesmen, collection costs).
62. See cases cited note 30 supra.
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in any aspect of the transaction from which the claim arises or in any
aspect of any enforcement of the claim, because of his lack of
knowledge, ability, experience, or physical or mental capacity." The
focus is on procedural unconscionability, but there is little change here
from that which was implicit in section 2-302 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code. As mentioned previously63 the UCC courts have always
looked to these elements in evaluating unconscionability vel non. The
language is taken with slight modification from section 5.107(3) of the
National Consumer Act, but the drafters' Official Comment to that sec-
tion does not indicate an intention to effect any change in the law, and
in fact refers to the UCC cases arising under section 2-302 as a guide-
line for what section 5.107 means, though the drafters do comment that
the section 2-302 courts have been "markedly conservative' in their ap-
plication of the unconscionability doctrine. The one possible change
I see in section 4-403(c)(1) comes from a strained reading of "in any
aspect of any enforcement of the claim" to disallow a claim that was
conscionable when the contract was made but has become unconscion-
able due to altered circumstances-a situation in which the UCC courts
have consistently refused relief."4 More likely, no change from the
UCC position was intended, and the chief import of this part of section
4-403(c)(1) is to permit the bankruptcy court to police the collection
tactics of the creditor. Taken as a whole, subsection (1) is an "under-
dog" provision-a directive to the court to examine carefully the claims
of creditors in any bankruptcy where the bankrupt was arguably taken
advantage of because of some personal deficiency, whether the defi-
ciency arose from lack of education, intelligence, or physical capacity.
Some guidance in the relevant factors can be gleaned from the lan-
guage of the consumer statutes on which this subsection was based.6 5
63. See text accompanying notes 5-41 supra.
64. West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 377 F. Supp. 154, 15 UCC Rep. Serv.
27 (M.D. Ala. 1974); J.L. MeEntire & Sons, Inc. v. Hart Cotton Co., 126 Ark. 937,
511 S.W.2d 179, 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1303 (1974). Section 5.107 of the National Con-
sumer Act includes unconscionability in the "result" of the transaction; the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code does not.
65. The Uniform Consumer Credit Code's provision is section 6.111(3), the rele-
vant portion of which states:
(3) In applying this section, consideration shall be given to each of the follow-
ing factors, among others:
(a) belief by the creditor at the time consumer credit sales, consumer
leases, or consumer loans are made that there was no reasonable proba-
bility of payment in full of the obligation by the debtor;
(b) in the case of consumer credit sales or consumer leases, knowledge
by the seller or lessor at the time of the sale or lease of the inability of
the buyer or lessee to receive substantial benefits from the property or
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Other questions remain. May the administrator or court disallow
in whole or in part claims based on contracts having unconscionable
clauses if the clauses were never invoked? If you answered, "Of
course not," consider this: the uninvoked unconscionable clause may
nonetheless have contributed to the bankruptcy by diminishing the
estate. For instance, suppose Honest John's Used Cars sold the debtor
a used car for the apparently fair price of 1000 dollars. The car was
represented as "fully guaranteed for thirty days," but another provision
of the contract explained that this and all warranties would be honored
only if the purchaser had the car examined for defects by an inde-
pendent mechanic within twenty-four hours of the sale, a step that the
debtor did not take. Another (conspicuous) clause in the contract dis-
claimed all implied warranties. Assume further that the car collapsed
into a heap of scrap metal while sitting in the debtor's garage on the
services sold or leased;
(d) the fact that the creditor contracted for or received separate charges
for insurance with respect to consumer credit sales or consumer loans with
the effect of making the sales or loans, considered as a whole, uncon-
scionable; and
(e) the fact that the respondent has knowingly taken advantage of the
inability of the debtor reasonably to protect his interests by reason of
physical or mental infirmities, ignorance, illiteracy or inability to under-
stand the language of the agreement, or similar factors.
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDr CODE § 6.111(3) (1968 version).
The National Consumer Act has two identical provisions along the same line, sec-
tions 5.107(3) and 6.109. Section 5.107(3) states in relevant part:
(3) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), the trier of fact shall be en-
titled to consider, among other things, the following as pertinent to the issue
of unconscionability:
(a) The degree to which the practice unfairly takes advantage of the lack
of knowledge, ability, experience, or capacity of consumers;
(b) Knowledge by those engaging in the practice of the inability of con-
sumers to receive benefits properly anticipated from the goods or services
involved;
(d) The fact that the practice may enable merchants to take advantage
of the inability of consumers reasonably to protect their interests by rea-
son of physical or mental infirmities, illiteracy or inability to understand
the language of the agreement, ignorance or lack of education or similar
factors;
(e) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
waive legal rights;
(f) The degree to which terms of the transaction require consumers to
jeopardize money or property beyond the money or property immediately
at issue in the transaction;
(g) The degree to which the natural effect of the practice is to cause or
aid in causing consumers to misunderstand the true nature of the transac-
tion or their rights and duties thereunder;
(h) The extent or degree to which the writing purporting to evidence the
obligation of the consumer in the transaction contains terms or provisions
or authorizes practices prohibited by law.
NATIONAL CONSUMER Acr § 5.107(3).
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second night after purchase. The debtor then read the contract care-
fully and, noting the independent mechanic requirement, went out and
bought another car in lieu of complaining to Honest John. If the
debtor goes bankrupt before paying Honest John, who later files
his claim, what leeway does section 4-403 give the administrator or
judge?
Viewed in light of the above considerations, 6 the first question
to be asked is whether the claim is "unconscionable." My conclusion
that failure to do comparative shopping is irrelevant to a finding of un-
conscionability has already been discussed.6 7  If the "independent me-
chanic" clause were hidden in the fine print, Llewellyn's "true an-
swer"' 8 obviously supports a ruling that the clause is both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. But what if the clause were not in
fine print and the debtor both read and understood it? Once the pro-
cedural unconscionability is excised, do subsections. 4-403(b) and (c)
permit a finding of "unconscionability"? It may easily be that the
debtor meant to get an independent inspection but forgot or became
too busy to do so, a neglect that Honest John foresaw and counted
upon. In my opinion Honest John should not escape the censure of
section 4-403(b)(8) simply because he correctly predicted the frailty
of human nature.
If the words "or because he was predictably human" are read into
the delineations of unconscionability in section 4-403(c)(1), 69 and
Honest John's claim is deemed "unconscionable," to what extent "in
amount" is it unconscionable? But for the "independent mechanic"
clause the debtor (a) might have recovered his money from Honest
John so that the claim would not exist, (b) might have had Honest John
repair the car and thereby increased the estate's assets, or (c) might
not have purchased the second car-an act which created another un-
paid creditor whose claim competes with Honest John's. My point is
66. For the sake of simplicity we will ignore state law attacks on the claim that
might be made on the basis of fraud, deceptive consumer sales statutes, and UCC provi-
sions such as sections 2-302, -316, and -719.
67. See text accompanying notes 59-60 supra.
68. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
69. The Commission's note to this section, paragraph 33, says that the language
of section 4-403
is adanted from wording in Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 6.111 and Na-
tional Consumer Act §§ 5.107 and 6.109. Clause (1) is a modification of Na-
tional Consumer Act § 5.107(1) and (3) (a). Clause (2) relies on language
from both Uniform Consumer Credit Code § 6.111(3) (c) and National Con-
sumer Act § 5.107(3) (c) but differs substantively from each. Clause (3) fol-
lows National Consumer Act § 6.107(3) (i).
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that by the use of a little imagination the court can almost always envi-
sion a situation in which the unconscionable clause could have had
some effect on the size of the estate. After weighing the equities of
the situation, the administrator or judge can allow as much or as little
of the claim as is fair, not feeling very much restricted by the meaning-
less words "in amount" or the fact that the unconscionable provision
was not obviously activated.
As noted previously, the Commission's version of the proposed act
applies only to consumer bankruptcies, while the Judges' version drops
the word "consumer" from section 4-403(b)(8) and applies the un-
conscionability defense across the board. Which is preferable? Con-
sumer bankruptcy is a serious problem; the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws noted that consumer bankruptcy currently constitutes ninety to
ninety-two percent of the new filings every year.70 And, as a practical
matter, consumers (especially those who go bankrupt) have the most
need of an unconscionability defense. But one has only to read Elkins-
Dell to realize that nonconsumer businesses can also be the prey of
rapacious lenders, sellers or thieves. The consumer who is forced to
incorporate needs this protection. The small business entity struggling
to compete against America's commercial behemoths or the govern-
ment itself7l needs this protection. The technicality of incorporation
does not necessarily imbue those who run the business with the com-
mercial stamina or savvy to withstand a creditor's unconscionable be-
havior. The fact is that the UCC unconscionability defense has been
successfully asserted by nonconsumer entities in over one-third of the
reported cases to date. Simply because there is a presumption that
businessmen read, understand, and willingly assent to all they sign,
does not mean that the presumption is conclusive, or that businesses
should not be given the benefit of section 4-403 in appropriate cases.
As to this section, the Judges' version of the proposed bankruptcy act
seems preferable.
70. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON BANKRUPTCY LAws, CCH BANKRUPTCY LAw
REPORTS 15 (Special Report, July, 1973).
71. It is not unknown for governmental agencies to insist on unconscionable con-
tractual provisions, nor for the courts to throw them out. See, e.g., Sylvan Crest Sand
& Gravel Co. v. United States, 150 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1945) (government could not in-
sist upon a provision giving it the right to cancel the contract without notice); Fehlhaber
Corp. v. United States, 151 F. Supp. 817 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877 (1957)
(government's disclaimer of the reliability of test boring data furnished to bidders on
construction project held ineffective when subsurface conditions proved the data inaccu-
rate); cf. Comment, Changed Conditions as Misrepresentation in Government Con.
tracts, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 978 (1967); Comment, Ambiguity in the Law of Gov-
ernment Construction Contracts, 7 SANTA CLnA LAw. 265 (1967).
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C. Adoption or Not?
The ultimate question of course is whether section 4-403's uncon-
scionability defense is a good idea deserving of adoption, or an unwar-
ranted extension of an idea that experiences under the UCC have al-
ready proved unworkable. In answering this question it is not enough
to conclude, as I have, that unconscionability is, lamentably, a term that
is likely never to be given a disciplined definition. The practical effect
of the inclusion of the unconscionability concept into the bankruptcy
act is of paramount concern. Professor Leff has criticized UCC section
2-302's use of unconscionability because judicial striking of unconscion-
able terms requires a lawsuit that is too expensive to bring and results
in relief for only one customer, so that its actual punitive significance
is small. 72 Given the fact that most creditors rightfully believe that a
debtor's bankruptcy means that the debt involved should be written off
as gone forever, the presence of a possible unconscionability defense
to their claim probably will have a negligible effect on their conduct
in the contract creation stage. Other provisions of the proposed act
may increase general creditor remuneration to the point that this atti-
tude changes, but on that we will have to wait and see. If distribution
continues more or less as before, the possibility of an unconscionability
defense in the event of bankruptcy will not alter the cupidity of general
creditors predisposed to overreaching. But secured creditors, who may
hope to survive bankruptcy with the collateral's value intact, may feel
threatened by a doctrine that could, if the Johnson case is followed, de-
stroy their secured position. The fact that a creditor has taken the time
and trouble to perfect a security interest shows that he is a planner-
just the sort on whom a bankruptcy unconscionability doctrine could
have a cautioning effect. So, while section 4-403 may not keep health
spas from taking money for pipe dreams of physical perfection, it just
may keep finance companies from opening their debtors' mail. And
if, as the expansion of unconscionability from the UCC to consumer
statutes73 to the proposed bankruptcy act indicates, unconscionability is
72. Leff, supra note 18, at 354-57. It would have been interesting to have wit-
nessed Professor Leff's reaction on learning that the drafters of the Proposed Act were
going to make unconscionability a ground for the disallowance of claims.
73. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-5 (Supp. 1973); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.107
(1974); NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT §§ 5.107, 6.109; UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE
§ 6.111. I know of no federal or administrative rule using the word "unconscionability,"
though the federal courts sometimes use it in deciding federal questions. See Miami
Tribe v. United States, 281 F.2d 202 (Ct. Cl. 1960) (sale of Indian lands at half true
value held unconscionable).
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of growing significance, its ubiquitousness may increase to the point
where its avoidance becomes an important concern of even the most
venal drafters of contracts.
Whether one supports the inclusion of unconscionability in the
bankruptcy act (or any other statute) depends in large part on the ex-
tent to which one trusts the judiciary. A fear of unchecked judicial
meddling leads to hard and fast statutory guidelines designed to restrict
the ability of a court to affect the outcome the legislature thought wis-
est. A belief in the competence and responsibility of the judiciary
sanctions statutes which, like section 4-403, provide wide room in
which the courts can work.
On a more pragmatic level, the adoption of an unconscionability
standard may be supported because it gives courts the freedom to do
more openly that which they would do without it. My personal experi-
ence has been that real judges (as opposed to the completely fictitious
creatures of law professorial lectures) pretty much do as they like in
their courtrooms, with the black letter rules of law a small hindrance
to the achievement of the result they feel is just. Every lawyer knows
the futility of trying to persuade a judge that precedent demands the
rendition of a judgment going against the overwhelming equities of the
situation. From Mansfield to Cardozo 74 to the best trial judges around
the response has been similar: not in my court. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter, hardly a judicial activist, is the author of one of the most famous
quotations along this line:
[I]s there any principle which is more familiar or more firmly em-
bedded in the history of Anglo-American law than the basic doc-
trine that the courts will not permit themselves to be used as instru-
ments of inequity and injustice? Does any principle in our law
have more universal application than the doctrine that courts will
not enforce transactions in which the relative positions of the
parties are such that one has unconscionably taken advantage of
the necessities of the other?
These principles are not foreign to the law of contracts.
Fraud and physical duress are not the only grounds upon which
courts refuse to enforce contracts. The law is not so primitive that
it sanctions every injustice except brute force and downright fraud.
More specifically, the courts generally refuse to lend themselves to
74. Cardozo's trademark is the landmark decision masquerading as a more or less
routine application of existing precedent. See, e.g., De Cicco v. Schweizer, 221 N.Y.
431, 117 N.E. 807 (1917) (contracts); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382,
111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (torts).
1256 [Vol. 53
UNCONSCIONABLE CLAIMS
the enforcement of a "bargain" in which one party has unjustly
taken advantage of the economic necessities of the other.
75
If judges will judge, hard legal rules or no, then an unconscionability
standard seems neither unduly vague nor a license to do more than
the courts are likely to do without it. This is not to say that judges are
without restraints. Some predictability in the law, particularly commer-
cial law, is a necessity if we are to have something other than "dog
law"-a creditor does not know he has done something wrong until his
nose is rubbed in it. Good judges will strive to articulate the reasons
for their findings of unconscionability, just as they do with the host of
other vague standards (good faith, commercial reasonableness, clean
hands, proximate cause, etc.) that must be applied to other problems.
If the judges go too far afield, legislative clarification, scholarly criti-
cism, and public disapprobation have some corrective effect.
II. CONCLUSION
In 1778 Lord Thurlow said of unconscionability, "The principle
then is loose enough . . .- looser than I wish to be established in a
court of justice." 76 Two hundred years of development have placed few
reins on the idea, which is now becoming a staple of pro-consumer stat-
utes. If, as seems likely, one of the proposed bankruptcy acts is
adopted with its unconscionability proposal intact, the concept achieves
a greater dignity than before. It is my opinion that this is a favorable
development. Even if unconscionability in bankruptcy is used loosely
without detailed explanations of its underpinnings, it has some remedial
effect beneficial to the conscionable creditors (if not the debtor, who
presumably has his discharge and is gone). The vague unease that a
nonspecific use of unconscionability will create in those who must re-
draft the stricken clause may not be a wholly bad result. And even
these decisions give some warning for the future; if the same clause
is invalidated again and again it soon stops appearing in contracts. As
time passes the good judges, and one hopes the commentators, will un-
doubtedly establish firmer guidelines, and as this happens unconscion-
ability will reach its maximum effectiveness as a deterrent to those
whose moral sensitivity is bounded only by that which the law will per-
mit.
75. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 326 (1942).
76. Gwynne v. Heaton, 28 Eng. Rep. 949, 953 (Ch. 1778).
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